2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-2-2013

USA v. Richard Caceres

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Richard Caceres" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 433.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/433

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-3356
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
RICHARD CACERES,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court,
District of New Jersey
(Crim. No. 1-11-cr-00798-001)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome Simandle
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 6, 2103
_____________
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 2, 2013)
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, Richard Caceres, alleges that the District Court for the District of New
Jersey substantively and procedurally erred when it sentenced him to a 151-month prison
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term for distribution of and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and
procedural history relevant to our disposition of this case.1 At the time of his arrest for the
present charge, Caceres was on parole and supervised release from two previous
convictions for drug related offenses. Specifically, Caceres had been convicted of a 2001
cocaine distribution charge within 1,000 feet of a school and of 2005 charges of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of the offense. After serving time for both offenses,
Caceres was deported to the Dominican Republic. However, in 2010, he unlawfully
reentered the country and was arrested later that year for the crimes at issue in this
appeal.
Caceres was charged in a one-count indictment with distributing and possessing
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C).
He pled guilty to the charge on March 30, 2012. Due to his prior criminal history,
Caceres was classified as a career offender. With a resulting offense level of 29 and
criminal history category of VI, Caceres’s Guideline range was 151 to 188 months’
imprisonment. Without the repeat offender categorization, the applicable guideline range
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
over the District Court’s Order of Judgment and conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We have jurisdiction to review Caceres’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006).
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would have been 57 to 71 months. At sentencing, Caceres moved to depart downward
from the career offender range, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b), arguing that his criminal
history was overstated. He also sought a downward departure based on his extraordinary
responsibilities for his children in the United States and for his sick father in the
Dominican Republic. The District Court denied his motion and, after considering the
relevant factors under § 3553(a), sentenced him to the bottom of the advisory range—151
months in prison.
II.
On appeal, Caceres contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion
for a downward departure, failing to adequately address the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,
and improperly referencing his unlawful reentry into the country.
First, Caceres argues that the District Court should have granted his motion for a
downward departure because his criminal history category overstated the seriousness of
his crimes and his likelihood of recidivism, and because he had extraordinary family
responsibilities. However, we are without jurisdiction to review a district court’s
discretionary decision to deny a motion to depart, so long as the district court’s refusal to
depart is not based on a “mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.” United
States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007). Caceres concedes that the District
Court “recognized . . . [it] could depart downward,” Appellant’s Br. at 5, and, based on
our review of the record, we agree. In addressing Caceres’s arguments, the Court found
that Caceres’s criminal history was not overstated because he was a “recidivist” whose
previous convictions were for “significant” crimes. App. BA64-65. It also found that his
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family responsibilities were not extraordinary enough to warrant a departure because “if
Mr. Caceres is in prison the children will still survive” and “whatever his father’s needs
may be, it’s not Mr. Caceres who is depended upon to fulfill them.” App. BA68. Because
the District Court acknowledged that “a downward departure may be warranted” in some
cases, App. BA63, but chose not to depart here based on the foregoing circumstances, we
may not disturb its decision.
Next, Caceres contends that the District Court failed to adequately weigh the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, he argues that the District Court
should have considered the disparity between his sentence and those of his co-defendants,
which ranged from 37 to 80 months in prison. District courts must give “meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d
Cir. 2006). However, the court need not state or even address all of the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 831 (3d Cir. 2006). We review a sentence to
determine whether the District Court reasonably applied the § 3553(a) factors to the case.
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330.
Here, the Court extensively discussed numerous sentencing factors, including
deterrence and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the crime
and promote respect for the law. Furthermore, contrary to Caceres’s contentions, the
District Court did in fact consider the “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6). After discussing the sentence imposed on one of Caceres’s codefendants, the Court explained, “even though the quantities for which the two were held
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are not that different, the resulting sentences are because of [Caceres’s] career offender
status and the . . . incorrigibility of Mr. Caceres.” App. BA42. It is clear from the record
that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors and
reasonably applied them to the facts of this case.
Finally, Caceres contends that the District Court improperly and repeatedly
referenced his unlawful reentry in determining his sentence. We disagree. Reentry after
deportation is a violation of the law, one which, along with Caceres’s other crimes, could
support an increased sentence, and is relevant to the history and character of the
defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Caceres’s argument that his sentence signals to
other courts that greater sentences can be imposed on illegal immigrants is unavailing.
The District Court was clear that it was focusing on his illegal activity rather than his
immigration status in imposing a sentence. In fact, Caceres received a sentence at the
bottom of the Guideline range. Caceres’s arguments are thus exaggerated. It is evident
that Caceres’s sentence was “premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of
the relevant factors.” United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

5

